Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit1 Christine M. Korsgaard I. Introduction A person is both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of experiences. Utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophers, however, characteristically give a different emphasis to these two aspects of our nature.
Christine Korsgaard presents the argument that having a practical identity is necessary for the existence of reasons and obligations. More specifically, she argues that one cannot choose to perform any action unless one has some conception of oneself. She claims that normativity stems from identity because one 's identity determines which.
ABSTRACT: Christine Korsgaard bases her interpretation of personal identity upon the notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek Parfit. Korsgaard indicates that actions and choices, from the practical standpoint, must be viewed as having agents and choosers.
Evaluate Korsgaard’s discussion of the Universalizability Argument. Christine Korsgaard argued for the universalizability of moral principles based on the notion of autonomy and categorical imperative as employed by Kant. He further argued that autonomy is the source of obligation and moral identity dictates moral obligations.
Christine M. Korsgaard Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy Harvard University. Welcome to my web page. I hope this page will be of use to my students, prospective Harvard students, and anyone trying to figure out how to reach me or locate one of my publications.
In order to justify the existence of personal identity, Christine Korsgaard puts forward the thesis of the practical standpoint. It is composed mainly of three parts: (1) the dichotomy between theoretical and practical facts, (2) the activity of moral agency, and (3) self-constitution in the sense of practical identity.
Christine M. Korsgaard Complete Writings with Web Access Information Where Available. Books. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, forthcoming from Oxford. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford, 2009; The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, 1996. Essay Collections The Constitution of Agency. Oxford, 2008.
In Lecture Three of The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard presents the argument that having a practical identity is necessary for the existence of reasons and obligations. More specifically, she argues that one cannot choose to perform any action unless one has some conception of oneself.
Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She was educated at the University of Illinois and received a Ph.D. from Harvard.
Korsgaard and the Reality of Pain 4 Such an identity defines how and to whom we hold ourselves accountable, what sorts of inter-personal relations and reactive attitudes are open to us, and what sorts of challenges we must answer and what ones we take ourselves to be entitled to put to others. Of.
By characterizing obligation as a reflective rejection of what threatens one’s identity, Christine Korsgaard introduces a suggestive approach to this normative concept.
A person’s identity is shaped by many different aspects. Family, culture, friends, personal interests and surrounding environments are all factors that tend to help shape a person’s identity. Some factors may have more of an influence than others and some may not have any influence at all. As a.
Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit: Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University). 6. Fission and the Focus of One's Life: Peter Unger (New York University).
The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology eBook: Korsgaard. this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology. Korsgaard draws on the work of important figures in the history of philosophy such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, showing how their ideas can inform.
This book presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation. Moral philosophy aspires to understand the fact that human actions, unlike the actions of the other animals, can be morally good or bad. Few moral philosophers, however, have exploited the idea that actions might be morally good or bad in virtue of being good or bad of their kind — good or bad as actions.
Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems.
M Kapstein, (Review) Collins, Parfit, and the Problem of Personal Identity in Two Philosophical Traditions. Philosophy East and West, 1986. Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 101-132.
Christine Korsgaard analyses the argument of Groundwork I in an article she originally published in 1989 and subsequently re-published both in her own collection of essays, Creating the Kingdom of Ends and also in a collection of essays on the Groundwork edited by Paul Guyer.Unlike the essay by Nelson Potter also published in Guyer's collection and which I responded to in a couple of previous.
Christine M. Korsgaard. Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.. Essays on practical reason and moral psychology. CM Korsgaard, CM Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, USA, 2014. 572: 2014: The normativity of instrumental reason. C Korsgaard. 572: 1997: Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response.